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With its ability to influence interest rates globally, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of
the US Federal Reserve is arguably one of the most important decision making bodies on the
planet. But how does it come to its decisions? In new research which analyses transcripts of FOMC
deliberations over nearly 30 years, Joseph Gardner and John T. Woolley find that women speak
less than men for nearly their entire tenure on the FOMC. While women are free to speak, they
write, they do not participate equally in FOMC deliberations, and this could be influencing policy
choices. 
In the wake of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve gained new prominence as it kept interest
rates low in an effort to prop up an ailing economy. Changes to the Fed’s interest rate are decided
by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is made up of Fed Board Governors and
Reserve Bank Presidents. But how does the FOMC deliberate its decisions, and who has the
biggest influence on how they are made?
In new research we assessed FOMC deliberations using two widely mentioned “conditions” for
good deliberation—that people can both freely and equally participate in deliberation.  By our measures FOMC
decision making is quite free in that people express disagreement, question others, and suggest issues that should
be addressed.  In contrast, FOMC participation is not equal.  Some aspects of FOMC inequality probably make
sense.  For example, more experienced members talk more.  But other aspects of inequality are indefensible.
In particular, we found that female members of the FOMC participate markedly less in that body’s policymaking
meetings.  This certainly raises normative concerns—what would justify such a pattern?  It matters for consequential
reasons as well:  Unequal participation may undermine the quality of the Fed’s deliberations.  In addition, a range of
research suggests that women differ from men in their policy preferences.  If policy choices differ across gender,
and if there are gender-based inequalities in participation, then resulting policy choices might reflect this fact.
We think the FOMC should make its decisions in a deliberative fashion.  By this we mean via a reason-based
process involving offering justifications for preferences and evaluating arguments.  However, such deliberation may
be undermined by unequal participation.  Inequalities in participation may limit the free expression of a broader
range of information, perspectives, and arguments.  Such contributions are partly what makes group deliberation a
better way of making decisions and could also reduce the likelihood of groupthink.  In a related way, with each
FOMC District Bank president representing a different geographic district, unequal participation could lead to the
under-representation of some regions’ interests.
Experimental research suggests that unequal participation in general, and less participation by women in particular,
leads to poorer performance on collective decision making tasks such as puzzle solving and negotiating over limited
resources.  Gender inequality may matter for other reasons.  Women differ from men across a wide range of issue
areas, including with respect to ideology, preferences over social welfare and economic policies, and support for
redistributive policies.  These differences characterize elites as well as citizens generally.
A variety of studies have identified gender-based differences in decision making among business executives.  For
example, firms with more women in management produce higher rates of return  and issue less debt.  More relevant
to the situation on the FOMC are studies showing gender differences in decision making among bankers.  Of
particular interest is research on the recent financial crisis showing that female bank CEO’s were more risk averse
than males when it came to setting capital holdings.
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There is indirect evidence for a pattern of gender-based policy differences on the FOMC.  Data prepared by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis show that between 1978-2007, when female members of the FOMC dissented,
they always did so in favor “ease,” that is, favoring a policy more likely to stimulate economic growth rather than
control inflation.  (However, in the September 21 meeting of this year, two female members dissented in favor of
tightening.) This observation about the policy preferences of female FOMC members suggests that inequality, along
with the small number of female members (only nine served on the FOMC between 1978-2007), may have reduced
the expression of support for more stimulative monetary policy.
A consistent comment of FOMC observers is that its members are not equal.  It is commonplace to observe that the
Chair is more than first among equals.  Top staff also have tremendous influence.  Are such views correct?  To
answer this, we examined patterns of participation in FOMC meetings.  The FOMC meets every six to eight weeks to
set policy concerning interest rates and other policy instruments.  Each meetings’ transcripts are released after a
five-year delay.  This delay balances transparency against the need for secrecy.  In our study we analyze the
verbatim transcript of every regular meeting from 1978-2007.
We calculated participation rates for each FOMC member, 18 persons per meeting assuming no vacancies or
absences.  Our measure of participation is the number of meeting sentences spoken by these participants in each
separate meeting they attended.  The quantity of talk contributed by each member, controlling for overall meeting
length, is our indicator of equality in deliberation.  We readily acknowledge that people who talk the most are not
always more influential, but they are availing themselves more thoroughly of the opportunity to influence others and
at the least they will tend to shape the tone of discussions.
What did we find?  Controlling for a variety of factors, our modeling shows that gender is significantly related to
participation rates.  In fact, we found gender to be one of the stronger drivers of unequal participation in FOMC
meetings.
This is easily seen in the time path of men’s versus women’s participation.  The inequality gap is greatest at the
outset of a woman’s term on the FOMC, as shown in Figure 1.  Our estimates show that with time this difference
diminishes and is eliminated after four years (or about 32 meetings).  However, four years was just about the
average total term of service for women during most of this period. This effectively means that during our study
period, women spoke less than men for nearly their entire tenure, leaving them with many fewer opportunities to
influence the body’s deliberations.
Figure 1 – Estimated Effect of Time Served as a Member on the Number of Sentences Spoken in FOMC
Meetings, Men and Women, 1978-2007
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Notes:  In this simulation, we make the following assumptions about the typical male and
female FOMC member:  both have PhD’s; neither hold positions as either district bank
presidents or the vice-chair of the Federal Reserve Board; neither are former top FOMC staff
members; and neither are voting to dissent.  Source:  Verbatim transcripts of FOMC
meetings, 1978-2007.
Our research shows that the FOMC deviates from strict participatory equality.  Does this matter?  It does not seem
to flow from any established practice of explicit discrimination.  In fact, Committee norms (and practice) seem to
require minimal participation by all members, a feature not found in many deliberative bodies.  But a robust body of
work suggests lower participation rates by women could be hurting the quality of the FOMC deliberation and it could
be influencing policy choices.
What can be done?  One straightforward possibility is suggested by Karpowitz and Mendelberg, who show that
women’s participation rates improve when the number of women in a group is increased.  Given the stark
underrepresentation of women on the FOMC, that is not an unreasonable prescription.  It is also possible that
gender inequality may decline under the leadership of Janet Yellen, the first woman to lead the Fed.  It will be some
years, however, before that proposition can be evaluated.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Measuring Deliberative Conditions An Analysis of Participant Freedom and
Equality in Federal Open Market Committee Deliberation’ in Political Research Quarterly.
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